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Environmental historians, in Donald Worster’s words,
insist that we have got to go …. down to the earth itself as an agent and 
presence in history … we must now and then get out of parliamentary 
chambers, out of birthing rooms and factories, get out of doors alto-
gether, and ramble into fields, woods, and the open air. It is time we 
bought a good set of walking shoes, and we cannot avoid getting some 
mud on them.
Environmental historians of China would do well to heed this call to get 
their boots dirty and head out into the environments that they research. Ven-
turing out of the archive and into the field, I would add, holds even greater 
importance for historians, like myself, who seek to write “history from the 
bottom” up in two senses of the term, studying interactions between people 
at the foundation of social hierarchies and the biophysical world that is, to 
borrow the words of environmental historian John McNeill, “the real sub-
strate of human affairs.”
This chapter offers an example of what environmental historians stand to 
gain from employing the tools of historical anthropology. It does so through 
a microhistory of post-1949 water and soil conservation (水土保持 shuitu-
baochi) in Northwest China’s Loess Plateau (黄土高原 Huangtu gaoyuan), 
a region covering 64,000 square kilometers that suffers from high rates of 
soil erosion and acute water shortages. Combining fieldwork with archival 
research reveals how the conjuncture of biophysical, socio-economic, and 
political processes generated environmental change, as well as how the rural 
people whose labor altered the landscape of Northwest China experienced 
those transformations.
Beginning in the 1950s, the government of the People’s Republic of China 
launched large-scale water and soil conservation campaigns in Shaanxi 
province and other parts of the Loess Plateau region. These movements mo-
bilized the rural populace to construct terraces, dams, embankments, and 
other land-management infrastructure. By combatting erosion, PRC leaders 
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expected these conservation efforts to limit siltation on the lower reaches 
of the Yellow River, prolong the life of dam megaprojects, and increase 
agricultural yields to support the PRC’s vigorous program of industriali-
zation. Conservation measures implemented after 1949, as part of China’s 
drive toward the interconnected goals of revolution and national economic 
development, struck at the most basic resources of all: land and water, and 
how people used them. These campaigns remade Northwest China’s rural 
landscape, changed how people farmed, and transformed patterns of work 
in the countryside.
I draw on fieldwork conducted in Gounan 沟南 village in Shaanxi’s Baishui 
白水 county, and documents from the Shaanxi Provincial Archives and the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences and Ministry of Water Resources Institute 
of Water and Soil Conservation (中国科学院水利部水土保持研究所 Zhong-
guo kexueyuan shuilibu shuitubaochi yanjiusuo) in Yangling 杨凌, Shaanxi, 
to examine how mass campaigns undertaken in the name of water and soil 
conservation during the Mao era affected local societies and environments. 
I address two interrelated questions: what did state-initiated conservation 
campaigns mean for the rural communities in China who depended on water 
and soil for their livelihoods? How did rural people take part in and respond 
to these campaigns? Assessing the local significance of post-1949 water and 
soil conservation initiatives enriches our understanding of modern Chinese 
environmental history, while adding an ecological dimension to scholarship 
that reassesses the history of Maoist China in terms of the “grassroots” and 
everyday life. My inquiry focuses on encounters between people and the 
land as mediated by the state, revealing how specific ecological practices 
were formed through complex interactions among local knowledge and pri-
orities, state imperatives, and dynamics of the natural landscape.
In Baishui county, as my forays out of the archive and into the village have 
revealed, water and soil conservation initiatives undertaken in the early 
PRC period actively drew upon local knowledge and experience. After 1949, 
agents of the PRC state identified and promoted conservation practices al-
ready in use in rural society, so as to limit erosion, control the Yellow River, 
and increase agricultural output. But in terms of land utilization and man-
agement in Baishui during the 1950s, a tension existed between the goals of 
state-initiated conservation campaigns and the priority that the rural pop-
ulace placed on sustaining production and ensuring subsistence. With rural 
laborers called on by the central and provincial government, county leaders, 
and local cadres to attend to water and soil conservation measures rather 
than other production activities, divergent imperatives could translate into 
competition over how to use land and allocate labor power. Local leaders, 
as archival sources and oral history interviews make clear, had to engage 
in constant negotiations with the rural populace to resolve these contradic-
tions. Fieldwork affords unique insight into these issues that go beyond the 
archival record, making it possible to comprehend what conservation meant 
at the local level.
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Mass experience in water and soil conservation
Baishui county is geographically situated in the lower-middle reaches of the 
Luo River 洛河, which flows some 680 kilometers through the Loess Pla-
teau before joining the Wei River 渭河 on central Shaanxi’s Guangzhong 
关中 Plain. Elevation in Baishui decreases from the northwest (1,000–1,550 
meters) to the southeast (350–600 meters), with most cultivated farmland at 
elevations between 650 and 1,000 meters. Gullies between 100 and 220 me-
ters in depth occupy half the county, dissecting the landscape into a maze of 
plateaus, ridges, and mounds. As in other parts of the Loess Plateau region, 
the fragile character of Baishui’s loess soils combines with its fragmented to-
pography and poor vegetation cover to make the land highly susceptible to 
erosion. The resulting water and soil loss hampers agricultural productivity, 
contributing to Baishui’s relative poverty.
Baishui first came to my attention through a 1953 survey report on water 
and soil conservation in the Luo River watershed. Along with detailing the 
severity of erosion and land degradation, the survey also observed that “the 
masses” in this area possessed “rich experience conserving water and soil.” 
Peasants in Baishui and surrounding counties had popular sayings related 
to water and soil conservation, such as the one that cautioned, “If the land 
does not have lips [i.e., terraces], people will starve (地没唇，饿死人 di mei-
chun, esi ren).” In the “dry plateau-gully area” in the Luo River’s middle 
reaches, experience had proven the efficacy of constructing terraces com-
pared to cultivating inclined land. The longstanding practice of building silt 
catchment dams had likewise turned the bottoms of most gullies in Baishui 
into fertile farmland. As the report noted, “These kinds of simple and easily 
implemented methods are already widely utilized by the masses in the pla-
teau area. In terms of water and soil conservation, they perform a definite 
function.”
In addition to checking erosion, conservation techniques targeted the 
acute water shortages that prevailed in Baishui and many other parts of 
Northwest China’s Loess Plateau. Most villages in the plateau-gully area 
had constructed water cellars (水窖 shuijiao) and ponds (涝池 laochi) to 
catch rainwater, “common types of methods by which the masses store wa-
ter.” Plateaus had a low water table, so wells were deep, and residents had 
to travel long distances to obtain water. Water cellars and ponds not only 
alleviated the problem of acquiring drinking water, but they also conserved 
runoff and alleviated water and soil loss. Baishui’s Gounan village, as the 
survey noted, had a total drainage area of 0.053 square kilometers, with 25 
water cellars and one pond, which could store 3.914 cubic meters of water. 
If a torrential rainstorm of 100 millimeters fell and the runoff factor was 
62.8 percent, water cellars and ponds could conserve rainwater, keeping it 
from flowing down the slopes and eroding the soil. To illustrate these con-
servation techniques, the survey report contained a topographical map of 
terraces constructed in a gully near the village to conserve soil, and a map 
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of the water cellars and ponds that residents of Gounan had dug to conserve 
rainwater. These maps piqued my curiosity and I decided to take a trip to 
Gounan village to see the place for myself.
Gounan as a model of collective conservation
I first went to Gounan in January 2016 and climbed around in the gully that 
I had seen cartographically represented in the water and soil conservation 
survey report. My jogging shoes, Worster might be pleased to know, came 
away covered in Baishui’s loess soil. When I met some of Gounan’s residents 
and explained that I had come to conduct research on water and soil con-
servation, they eagerly took me to see Tuqiaogou 土桥沟 (Earthen Bridge 
Gully), the ravine south of the village, where a man called Yang Lingjun 
杨凌俊 (1889–?) had gained renown during the first decade of the PRC pe-
riod for building terraces. In addition to looking at a photograph of the site 
of Yang Lingjun’s terraces taken in 1959, I interviewed the octogenarian 
Yang Xuxiang 杨许祥, Gounan’s former cooperative accountant, brigade 
leader, and party-branch secretary, who gave me a copy of Gounan wangshi 
沟南往事, the village history that he had written.
Yang Lingjun, I was told, came from an impoverished background. In 
his youth, he had eked out a living working as a hired laborer digging water 
cellars for more affluent households. After a catastrophic drought struck 
Shaanxi in 1929, Yang and his family sold all of their land on the plateau and 
moved to live in Tuqiaogou, where they set up a shed and started to cultivate 
around 100 mu 亩 of inclined land. Over several years, as Yang Xuxiang’s 
village history records, Yang Lingjun and his nephews gradually
filled trenches and constructed embankments (填壕邦埝 tianhao bang-
nian), made sloping land into horizontal terraces (水平梯田 shuiping 
titian), built embankments on low-lying land (埝窝地 nianwodi), dug 
fish-scale pits (鱼鳞坑 yulinkeng), and planted trees on empty land be-
side embankments to control water and soil erosion.
With these measures to control water and soil loss, grain production per mu 
on Yang Lingjun’s land increased from 40–50 jin 斤 to over 100 jin. For these 
achievements, Yang Lingjun earned the nickname “Old Man of the Earthen 
Bridge” (土桥老汉 tuqiao laohan) from his fellow villagers.
After learning about Yang Lingjun and Tuqiaogou during my initial visit 
to Gounan, I went back to the Shaanxi Provincial Archives in Xi’an and 
uncovered a wealth of materials on the local history of water and soil con-
servation in the village. Unlike my local informants, archival documents 
stress the limitations of pre-existing conservation techniques and the ne-
cessity of state-initiated campaigns to improve them. These sources related 
that terraces covered only a portion of the gullies around Gounan in the 
early 1950s. Apart from Yang Lingjun’s land, terraces had limited scope 
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and effectiveness. Like in other parts of Baishui, erosion posed a serious 
threat to cultivated fields. Since the mid-nineteenth century, erosion from 
Tuqiaogou had formed nine branch gullies and runoff from the watershed 
accounted for half of annual precipitation. In a report on the management 
of Tuqiaogou from November 1957, Baishui’s county head Li Chongshu 
李崇书 noted that,
since vegetation cover is poor, soil and water erosion conditions are rel-
atively severe. Here people often say, “When thunder sounds, people 
suffer disaster. The floodwaters that come are worse than tigers and 
wolves.” In this manner, the more the gully is washed away the deeper 
it gets and the more the gully gets washed away the longer it gets. Cul-
tivated land decreases, soil gets poorer, and production decreases by 
the year.
Tuqiaogou lost over 16,000 cubic meters of soil due to erosion annually, 
washing away more than 792 tons of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium— 
equivalent to 15 times the amount of fertilizer applied to the gully each year. 
As a result, pre-1949 grain production in the locale averaged a meager 40–50 
jin per mu. In years of dearth or drought, there was almost no harvest.
Beginning with the 1954 formation of primary agricultural cooperatives, 
which Yang Lingjun joined early on, Baishui’s county leaders mobilized the 
rural populace to dig trenches, build embankments, and construct terraces 
on sloping land. Local cadres in Gounan, “led all of the village’s coopera-
tive members to go to war against Tuqiaogou, advancing militarily against 
nature, demanding productivity from barren hills and barren gullies, with 
everyone going all out and getting at it.” Yang Lingjun’s experience had pro-
vided a “foundation,” as Yang Xuxiang insisted in an interview conducted 
during one of my later visits, but he acknowledged that the collectives man-
aged land better than individual farmers had done previously, and the coop-
erative’s leaders prioritized water and soil conservation.
Archival documents, however, present conservation as a top-down rather 
than a bottom-up initiative. Looking back from 1957, Li Chongshu’s report 
stated that after several years of diligence conservation campaigns had 
“changed ‘poor gullies and bad pieces [of land]’ and created a fortunate 
situation in which ‘households have water cellars, villages have ponds, all 
land has terraces, all gullies have dams, and there are trees beside the em-
bankments.’” Through terracing and tree-planting, the Gounan brigade’s 
residents ensured that “water did not run down the plateaus and soil did 
not wash down the slopes,” thereby “forcefully assisting in the realization 
of the nation’s great plan to fundamentally control Yellow River disasters.” 
When 45 millimeters of precipitation fell in June 1954, conservation meas-
ures at Tuqiaogou preserved all of the storm runoff. With erosion kept in 
check, rainwater stayed in fields and agricultural production increased. By 
1956, production per mu reached 150–160 jin and average incomes improved 
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as well. In this manner, as Li’s report emphasized, conservation furthered 
the PRC’s larger goals of controlling the Yellow River and increasing 
grain output.
County leaders, as narrated in the archival documents, drew on local 
knowledge and techniques to lay the basis for these efforts. In this account, 
initiative came from agents of the PRC state as much as the local popu-
lace. Initially, Baishui’s county leaders did not have adequate experience 
promoting water and soil conservation. “For that reason,” county head Li 
Chongshu explained, “we deputed technical cadres deep into the field to 
summarize the experience of the local masses.” These techniques included 
building trenches and embankments, constructing terraces on slopes, build-
ing dams in gullies to block silt and impede runoff, constructing terraces 
in gullies, digging water cellars and building ponds beside roads and vil-
lages, dispersing rainwater’s flow and guiding runoff into fields, building 
gully-head defenses and water drops, and filling in collapses. They also in-
cluded planting trees and other vegetation beside villages, on embankments, 
and on abandoned slopes. Afterwards, as conservation efforts at Tuqiao-
gou went forward, leaders “affirmed and extended” this mass experience, 
“which performed a definite function.”
During these campaigns, Baishui county leaders extoled Yang Lingjun’s 
success as a model for emulation. As Li Chongshu described,
After more than twenty years of arduous labor, he [Yang Lingjun] finally 
made land on the two banks of a branch gully of 96 mu into terraces. 
Productivity increased over the years and in 1954 output per mu reached 
185 jin, more than doubling the 90 jin per mu on most level tableland.
The best five mu of wheat had an average production per mu that reached 
360 jin, which was twice the 180 jin produced on most plateau land. The 200 
pepper plants and 100 pomegranate plants grown on embankments and in 
depressions unsuitable for grain cultivation also generated income, with the 
pepper plants alone bringing in over 100 yuan a year.
Official materials designating Yang Lingjun as an “advanced producer” 
(先进生产者 xianjin shengchanzhe) in 1958 commended him for rationally 
utilizing the land and “accumulating abundant water and soil conservation 
experience to ensure income.” Under Yang Lingjun’s influence, Gounan’s 
residents mobilized to build terraces on over 680 mu of inclined land between 
1954 and 1958. Yang also garnered acclaim for the experience he had accu-
mulated digging more than 400 water cellars in his lifetime, and for his activ-
ism in cooperative work. Although Yang could not engage in physical labor 
due to his old age during the conservation campaigns of the 1950s, he person-
ally went down into water cellars to direct young people carrying out work.
The local people I spoke with echoed the official archive by recalling 
the gains in agricultural production that resulted from conservation meas-
ures. But in oral history interviews they placed even greater emphasis on 
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conservation’s role in alleviating the village’s severe water shortages. Yang 
Lingjun’s skill at digging rain-saving water cellars was of especially great 
importance in Gounan, where the low water table (more than 120 meters 
underground) made it all but impossible to dig wells. Residents could collect 
water from a spring about one li away in the gully to the north of the village. 
But each trip to carry 40–50 jin of water back on shoulder poles took half 
an hour. Besides, water supplies obtained from the spring could barely meet 
the needs of the people and livestock in the village. In the dry-plateau area, 
as Yang Xuxiang explained during our conversations,
Droughts couldn’t be avoided. There were no water sources! …. This 
isn’t an irrigated area. With these natural disasters, you had to rely on 
heaven to eat (靠天吃饭 kao tian chifan). There was nothing you could 
do about it.
Following Yang Lingjun’s example and digging water cellars did not elim-
inate these water-scarcity problems, but it could at least alleviate them. In 
Gounan, people dug water cellars beside roads and anywhere else that water 
could be stored. In the village, as Yang Xuxiang explained, “water cellars 
were originally dug in basically all the fields. Some have had them for many 
decades or even centuries.”
Because the PRC state prioritized water conservancy and agricultural 
production, local conservation projects garnered higher-level official sup-
port as a means of realizing national objectives. The official archive re-
flects these priorities. Thanks to the central government’s leadership after 
1949 and “under the inspiration of the ‘National Comprehensive Plan to 
Fundamentally Control Yellow River Flood Disasters and Develop Yel-
low River Water Conservancy’ (国家根治黄河水害和开发黄河水利综合规划 
Guojia genzhi Huanghe shuihai he kaifa Huanghe shuili zonghe guihua),” as 
Li Chongshu stated, locals devoted their efforts to the PRC state’s goal of 
“reconstructing the hilly areas (建设山区 jianshe shanqu).” To this end, tech-
nical personnel from the Yellow River Water Conservancy Commission’s 
Northwest Engineering Bureau (西北工程局 Xibei gongchengju) came to 
Gounan to assist Baishui’s county leaders in formulating comprehensive 
plans for management of Tuqiaogou. After summarizing Yang Lingjun’s 
experience, Baishui’s county government and other official agencies con-
vened three on-the-spot meetings at Tuqiaogou in 1956 to promote the con-
servation measures practiced in Gounan, with more than 420 cadres from 
various townships and collectives coming to observe and study. Some of the 
most prominent provincial leaders in Shaanxi at the time, including Zhao 
Shoushan 赵寿山 and Zhao Boping 赵伯平, personally attended the meet-
ings. At another water and soil conservation training class attended by 43 
“backbone” (骨干 gugan) cadres, Yang Lingjun introduced his management 
techniques and demonstrated their results.
Mud on your boots 195
While official documents highlight the interventions of state agents, 
my interviews with Yang Xuxiang foreground the importance of the local 
knowledge held by peasants like Yang Lingjun in laying the foundation for 
water and soil conservation programs. As Yang Xuxiang put it,
Of course, that old man [Yang Lingjun]’s achievements can’t be oblit-
erated. With that basis, there was already water and soil conservation 
and experience building terraces. But when the old man spoke he did not 
have any [educational] level (水平 shuiping) and could not speak clearly.
Rather than explaining conservation techniques, Yang Lingjun only said 
things like: “Work hard! Tamp down the dirt well! Don’t let the water run off! 
Don’t let the (soil) fertility run off! The land can increase production!” That 
simple language, according to Yang Xuxiang, served as the “basis” for water 
and soil conservation measures. Subsequently, “The county, district (xiang), 
and township (zhen) established water and soil conservation cooperatives and 
developed these practices, listening to the old man’s experience.” Specialized 
technical personnel translated Yang Lingjun’s experience into techniques 
that could be replicated in a programmatic way in other locales. But in Yang 
Xuxiang’s telling, conservation was, first and foremost, a local initiative.
Once promoted beyond Gounan, these water and soil conservation prac-
tices proved effective in terms of checking erosion and increasing productiv-
ity. Li Chongshu reported that in addition to managing 308,112 mu of land 
in 1956, which exceeded Baishui’s target of 180,000 mu by 171 percent, these 
conservation initiatives “also accelerated development of terrace construc-
tion.” For this reason, Li praised Tuqiaogou as a model for all of Baishui:
We must make unceasing efforts to carry out terracing and greening 
(绿化 lühua) of all the county’s gullies just as has been done in Tuqia-
ogou, diligently completing the water and soil conservation mission to 
support the realization of the Yellow River control projects and improve 
the people’s livelihood.
In Gounan, as Yang Xuxiang proudly recalled,
The plateau and the slopes were completely managed, so soil did not 
go down the plateau, water did not go out of the gully, and mud did 
not go out of the gully, so it was all conserved. In the gully a dam was 
also built—an earthen dam (土坝 tuba). With this management, pro-
duction also increased, and we were appraised as a model (典型都评上了 
 dianxing dou pingshang le).
In large part, as detailed in Yang Xuxiang’s village history, Gounan’s ability 
to attain this model status had to do with the efforts of local leaders who 
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built their own reputation by publicizing the village’s achievements in water 
and soil conservation. In 1957, Gounan’s party secretary Yang Yuesheng 
杨岳胜 (1925–1984) represented the brigade at the Shaanxi Province Ad-
vanced Agricultural Unit Work Conference (陕西省农业先进单位工作会议 
Shaanxi sheng nongye xianjin danwei gongzuo huiyi), where he introduced 
Tuqiaogou’s conservation experience. At this event, Yang Yuesheng re-
ceived a banner from the PRC State Council’s Water and Soil Conservation 
Commission. The elderly Yang Lingjun could not attend the meeting due 
to his poor health, as Yang Xuxiang related during our interviews, so his 
nephew attended on his behalf. The following year, when local leaders—but 
not Yang Lingjun—attended the central government’s Agricultural Social-
ist Construction Conference (农业社会主义建设会议 Nongye shehui zhuiyi 
jianshe huiyi) in Beijing, the State Council once again presented Gounan a 
certificate of commendation signed by Zhou Enlai 周恩来. Singled out for 
this praise, Gounan fit into a pattern characteristic of water and soil con-
servation initiatives throughout China in the 1950s, which fostered model 
locales selected because of favorable or special conditions for propaganda 
and demonstration, and comprehensive development of small watersheds 
like Tuqiaogou.
Landscapes of labor
For Gounan’s rural populace, as oral history interviews make evident, wa-
ter and soil conservation measures mainly entailed back-breaking physical 
labor. During the Republican period only the most well-off households in 
the village—the wealthy peasants and upper-middle peasants, according to 
Yang Xuxiang—had wheelbarrows or handcarts. After 1949 such tools re-
mained in extremely short supply. Reliance on clumsy wooden carts, com-
bined with the lack of roads, made moving earth for conservation projects a 
difficult task. As Yang Xuxiang explained:
When you pushed those [carts], if you didn’t have strength and you 
didn’t have skill, you couldn’t move them. Out in the fields you pushed 
that way, and if the cart didn’t move you pushed it this way, pushing it 
along slowly. Gradually over time a road was opened up (碾开 niankai) 
by pushing them.
Moving dirt-filled wooden carts up the steep slopes surrounding Gounan 
proved most challenging. To keep runoff from eroding the head of Tuqiao-
gou, Yang Xuxiang told me, “the entire village went out to move earth. Peo-
ple carried it on shoulder poles, they pushed wooden carts, and shoveled it.” 
Only after an extended period of mass mobilization did Gounan’s residents 
move enough earth to redirect the flow of water and protect the gully head, 
thereby limiting erosion.
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To get people to do the heavy work necessary to transform the physical 
landscape, local leaders in Baishui during the 1950s had to resolve what 
archival documents term the “temporary contradiction between water and 
soil conservation and agricultural production.” Conservation projects had 
numerous components, with labor intensive work to do in all four seasons. 
But after cooperativization, as county head Li Chongshu pointed out, ag-
ricultural production witnessed “a new high tide” and double-cropping 
increased, which decreased the amount of land left fallow and created diffi-
culties in developing field engineering projects. The crux of the issue was that 
land and labor could be utilized for conservation work or farming, but not 
for both purposes simultaneously. Crops could not be grown on land that 
had been dug up to build terraces, embankments, or other conservation in-
frastructure. “If this contradiction is not appropriately solved,” Li warned, 
“it will influence agricultural production; or else it will squeeze out water 
and soil conservation.” Resolving the problem was of utmost importance.
Li Chongshu’s report outlined the methods Gounan and other parts of 
Baishui had adopted to tackle this contradiction: “Based on the needs of 
current farming activities, divide the contents of various water and soil con-
servation projects into those that are unhurried, those that are urgent, and 
those that must be carried out with comprehensive planning.” Local cadres 
had to vary the timing of each kind of project to ensure that conservation 
work did not alter or occupy land needed for cultivation. When not tending 
crops in summer and autumn, they mobilized residents to construct earthen 
embankments and terraces; in autumn and spring, they built silt dams and 
other larger-scale projects. During the winter and spring, the slack agricul-
tural season, they dug water cellars and ponds, and filled in collapses.
When implementing these arrangements, as Li Chongshu advised, one 
had to “flexibly initiate based on concrete circumstances.” In 1956, for in-
stance, excess rains delayed the summer harvest until the time when late- 
autumn crops were to be planted. In this situation, local cadres adopted 
the slogan “when the land is empty repair it,” and “repair first and sow the 
land early for broom-corn millet and millet; repair afterwards and sow land 
later for oats and winter wheat.” To make effective use of time, cadres in-
structed peasants to leave aside pieces of land wherever engineering projects 
were done. After digging up the soil, they sowed these plots with oats. As a 
result, Li held, “water and soil conservation did not interfere with farming 
season, and the masses were satisfied.” When moving earth for conservation 
projects, technical guidance ensured that cultivators preserved the fertile 
topsoil to avert decreases in productivity.
At the same time, meeting conservation targets required careful adjust-
ment of work schedules and incentives. Local cadres had to “rationally han-
dle labor compensation” to ensure that water and soil conservation work 
met quality standards, and “solve [the issue of] insufficient labor power.” To 
this end, Baishui county leaders combined “temporary assaults” (临时突击
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linshi tuji) that organized the entire populace during slack farming season 
with year-round management. In conjunction with these “assaults,” tem-
porary work teams were organized for specific projects, while brigades al-
located labor for conservation work as part of their annual plans. “Doing 
it this way,” wrote Li, “avoided the shortcoming of cooperative members 
worrying that work points were not evenly distributed.”
In our conversations, Yang Xuxiang repeatedly stressed the seasonal 
rhythms of water and soil conservation work. During the busy agricultural 
season, cooperative members planted crops; in the slack season, they at-
tended to water and soil conservation, especially during winter when farm-
ers would customarily have taken a well-deserved rest. To do conservation 
work, people now had to labor year-round. When not farming, everyone 
with the capacity to do labor—male and female, young and old—devoted 
their efforts to conservation projects. According to Yang Xuxiang,
Water and soil conservation means saving water and protecting soil. Be-
cause water runs off, soil runs off and fertility runs off. When fertility 
runs off, productivity also suffers. The masses were organized to uti-
lize the slack agricultural season to do it on a large scale (大搞 dagao), 
and during the busy agricultural season to do it on a small scale (小搞 
xiaogao). Soil fertility could keep up, so productivity could keep up. 
When there is water, fertility can be conserved; when there is fertility, 
production can be conserved.
But the rural populace did not necessarily consume the increases in output 
that resulted from these conservation measures. They had little power to 
decide what and how to produce. Cooperative leaders made these decisions. 
With the institution of the PRC’s Unified Purchase and Supply (统销统购 
tongxiao tonggou) system in late 1953, cooperatives had to deliver any grain 
surpluses that resulted from water and soil conservation efforts to the state 
at artificially low prices. To implement conservation measures, collectives 
thus had to monitor work quality, adjust labor incentives and compensation 
via work points, and carry out ideological education and propaganda. The 
example of labor models like Yang Lingjun helped to convey these messages. 
In addition to participating “actively and responsibly” in all government 
campaigns, Yang Lingjun garnered praise for an instance in 1949 when he 
volunteered an additional 200 jin on top of his household’s tax grain (公粮 
gongliang) obligations. According to a 1958 document, Yang considered this 
his “glorious responsibility.” Rural cultivators, in this didactic message, had 
a moral duty to hand over their grain to the state.
To convince the local populace of water and soil conservation’s impor-
tance, as Li Chongshu stated, cadres had to educate peasants about the 
equivalence between individual and collective benefits, as well as between 
immediate and long-term benefit. Li advised that labor quotas set for water 
and soil conservation should consider each locale’s “special characteristics:” 
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the character of the soil, the work’s technical nature, people’s technical pro-
ficiency, and the quotas set for other agricultural tasks. Water and soil con-
servation projects entailed heavy labor, so “in principle” they should count 
for more work points than other kinds of farm work.
Methods of compensation, as Li Chongshu explained, also differed based 
on how early or late projects would reap benefits and the area’s “special 
characteristics.” For example, “field engineering projects” like terraces, 
field embankments, and contoured gully embankments were “mostly re-
corded as agricultural work, with dividends distributed in the same year.” In 
contrast, work points for projects like silt dams, gully-head defenses, ponds, 
and check dams, “because benefits are reaped later,” were “mostly recorded 
as capital construction work, with the burden distributed among total labor 
power and dividends distributed according to periods (of 2–3 years).” After 
adopting these measures, Li claimed, “laborers’ activism greatly increased.” 
However, other reports state that a decision was later made to provide com-
pensation for all conservation work in the current year, since waiting to dis-
tribute the value of work points in succeeding years negatively influenced 
labor effectiveness.
In our interviews, Yang Xuxiang likewise emphasized the importance of 
work points as the motivation and incentive for doing conservation work. In 
what he called the “standard system (标准制 biaozhun zhi),” one able-bodied 
adult male’s “labor power (劳动力 laodongli)” received ten work points for 
one day of work. This arrangement was also called the “ten-point system.” 
(Women, however, received only eight work points per day). Later, the co-
operative shifted to promoting a piece-rate system—literally “fixed effort 
system (定力制 dingli zhi)”—for allocating work points.
As Yang Xuxiang explained, the piece-rate system meant that male 
laborers earned ten work points on a typical workday (工时 gongshi). But 
they could earn more work points for exceeding targets stipulated by the 
cooperative:
For example, when doing water and soil conservation by digging 
trenches and building terraces…if you completed so many earthworks 
you got so many work points. If you completed a lot of earthworks, you 
got more and if you completed fewer earthworks you got fewer.
The standard for male laborers was ten work points, in other words, but 
those who were “willing to put forth effort (肯出力的 ken chuli de)” earned 
more based on their performance. Yang Xuxiang proudly told of his ability 
to earn work points in this manner: “I once had those kinds of results. When 
I was young, I wasn’t tall, but I was strong….I shouldered that carrying pole 
and I was fast, gathering earth all in one place to earn work points.” When 
building a dike with one his comrades, Yang Xuxiang recalled that, even 
though it typically took eight people to move ten fang 方 of earth in a day, 
the two of them hauled ten fang in a single morning, which earned each of 
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them 25 work points. “I could turn out for work (出勤 chuqin) and earn over 
20 or even 30 work points, earning two or three workdays’ worth…If you 
were willing to put forth effort, you could get work points.”
However, the necessity of earning work points to make a living damp-
ened any opposition to water and soil conservation projects that may have 
existed among the local populace. When asked if any cooperative members 
in Gounan ever expressed unwillingness to do water and soil conservation 
work, Yang Xuxiang emphatically stated that they did not:
To earn work points, you did not pay any attention to those matters. 
There were no opposing ideas. At that time, people were obedient…
Peasants did farm work under the direction of the agricultural cooper-
ative. Working for the agricultural cooperative, you couldn’t do work 
according to your likes and dislikes. That wouldn’t do.
The launch of the Great Leap Forward in 1958 ramped up the scale of water 
and soil conservation work all over Shaanxi. As Yang Xuxiang related, from 
1958 to 1959 “going all out against Tuqiaogou” (大搞土桥沟 dagao Tuqia-
ogou) became a model for emulation throughout the entire province. But 
water and soil conservation campaigns soon ran into serious difficulties. 
Since the early 1950s, local leaders and higher-level authorities in Shaanxi 
had vaunted Gounan’s experience digging water cellars. Starting in 1958, 
local leaders mobilized other locales to follow suit. Yang Shiye 杨师叶, a for-
mer labor model from a female work team in Baishui’s Fumeng 扶蒙 village, 
currently in her early eighties, told of her experience during this conserva-
tion campaign. Cadres instructed Fumeng’s residents to dig water cellars in 
pairs, constructing “husband and wife water cellars” (夫妻窖 fuqi jiao) and 
“sisters’ water cellars” (姐妹窖 jiemei jiao) to collect rainwater. Yang Shiye 
and her husband heeded the call, but it resulted in a serious accident: “He 
was below digging. I was hauling up the earth. The rope snapped, and I fell 
in…That was 1958, when damn-near everyone dug water cellars (他妈都打过
窖 tama dou dagou jiao).” Residents mobilized in other parts of Shaanxi to 
meet their water cellar targets with little regard for quality complained that: 
“We’ve dug so many ‘black holes.’ They occupy land, donkeys fall into them. 
They’re useless. It’s really a waste of manpower and resources.”
At the height of the Great Leap Forward, fulfilling mounting conserva-
tion targets required both men and women to work at night. Rural women, 
for their part, had to somehow balance the exhausting work of transforming 
the land with their many other responsibilities. When asked who took care 
of cooking and other domestic labor during water and soil conservation 
campaigns, Yang Shiye replied that,
We just did the housework—we weren’t single men (我们这又不是单身汉 
women you bu shi danshenhan). We made the food in advance and ate 
it when we came home…When we went out early in the morning we 
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prepared food and left it in the pot. When we came back, whether it was 
hot or cold, we hastily ate it and went out again. We did three shifts…
At that time, you couldn’t even think about eating well. In the evening 
there was night work (夜干 ye gan). When it was busy, you had to work 
at night for at least two or three hours.
Even archival sources note that the burden of conservation campaigns dur-
ing the Great Leap weighed heavily on the rural populace. According to one 
document, cooperative members in Beiqian 北乾 village, which from 1956 to 
1959 formed a high-level cooperative alongside Gounan,
disliked that the retained grain standard (留粮标准 liu liang biaozhun) 
was too low and that water and soil conservation was heavy work that 
[made them] eat a lot, and so were not willing to go into the fields.
When drought struck in 1960 and state grain requisitioning did not relent, 
the threat of famine brought conservation work to a standstill. Although 
demographic data and oral history interviews indicate that Baishui did 
not witness the kind of famine-related mortality seen elsewhere in China, 
the county’s populace certainly suffered from extreme dearth and hunger. 
Not until 1962–1963, when the PRC central government issued a new se-
ries of directives on water and soil conservation, did these activities regain 
momentum.
Conclusion
This in-depth examination of water and soil conservation in Baishui county 
after 1949 demonstrates how agents of the PRC state appropriated and syn-
thesized pre-existing vernacular knowledge forms and practices, promoted 
them as models, and reapplied them at the local level. Village cadres in 
Gounan actively publicized this “peasant experience” in their efforts to gain 
higher-level state recognition and support. Yet conservation efforts did not 
garner automatic acceptance. Implementation of conservation measures re-
quired careful adjustment of farming practices and labor incentives to avoid 
disrupting agricultural production.
Conservation campaigns launched in Baishui during the 1950s reoriented 
skills and techniques that mediated human interactions with the land and its 
resources away from the subsistence imperatives of the rural populace, sub-
suming this knowledge within the state’s larger-scale developmental agenda. 
The rural populace may have acquired new skills, but they lost the ability to 
deploy them as they saw fit. Water and soil conservation campaigns meant 
meeting targets and fulfilling state-defined goals of controlling the Yellow 
River and extracting agricultural resources. They had little to do with ad-
vancing the priorities of the rural populace and rarely took their needs and 
aspirations into account.
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Methodologically, combining environmental history and historical an-
thropology to better appreciate the environment’s role in history starts 
with getting outdoors and encountering the landscapes that we write about. 
Whenever possible, it also means talking with the people who have inhabited 
those environments, relied on them for their livelihoods, and transformed 
them through their physical labor. Rather than separating fieldwork from 
archival research, this chapter demonstrates the value of shuttling back and 
forth between the archive and the field. Reading documents gives our field-
work direction; fieldwork makes it possible to navigate archives more effec-
tively and interpret written materials in a more rigorously contextualized 
manner.
The fieldwork I have conducted in Gounan complements the archival re-
cord, at least partially corroborating official accounts from the 1950s that 
some might reflexively dismiss. However, these two types of sources narrate 
conservation campaigns from distinctly different perspectives. Reports from 
Baishui county leaders like Li Chongshu speak of mobilizing the masses to 
check water and soil loss, thereby fulfilling the national goals Yellow River 
water conservancy and increasing agricultural production. Top-down in-
terventions, in this view, effectively summarized “peasant experience” and 
resolved the contradictions that stood in the way of plans to remake the 
environment. Oral histories, however, narrate water and soil conservation 
as a largely bottom-up initiative. Rather than higher-level party leaders or 
technical personnel, conservation started with model peasants like Yang 
Lingjun and gained recognition through the efforts of grassroots cadres.
At that same time, the significance that oral history interviews ascribe to 
water and soil conservation differs markedly from the meanings attached 
to it in the official record. Rather than the national-level objective of con-
trolling the Yellow River, as my fieldwork has revealed, local people valued 
conservation for its ability to improve their livelihoods by alleviating re-
source scarcities. At least until the Great Leap Forward, conservation in-
itiatives succeeded in meeting Gounan residents’ most pressing needs by 
boosting grain output and providing access to drinking water. In contrast 
to the government archive, moreover, oral history interviews emphasize the 
sheer amount of work that went into achieving this transformation of the 
natural landscape. For the local populace, motivation for taking part in 
such backbreaking toil came from their need to earn work points, but not 
from a desire to meet the PRC state’s centrally defined plans.
Without visiting Gounan village and getting familiar with the surround-
ing landscape, I would have never known what questions to ask residents 
about their experience with conservation and what it meant for them. Nor 
would I have recognized the sheer scale of this effort to transform nature 
and the human labor that went into it. It took getting my boots dirty to 
appreciate the work required to carry drinking water and move earth for 
conservation projects up these steep slopes. This landscape, I recognized 
only after visiting Gounan and speaking with elderly villagers like Yang 
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Xuxiang, fundamentally shaped work patterns, the quotidian rhythms of 
everyday life, and the meanings that conservation campaigns held for them. 
To appreciate the presence of the earth in history, you need to get out and 
walk around.
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